It was becoming more and more possible that Japan, who’s aggressive intention was growing day by day, might any time close the Trans-Siberian Railway. This was a real threat to the Soviets.later, in 1945, Stalin told Chiang Chingkuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, “Outer Mongolia is located in a very important strategic junction for the Soviet Union. Therefore it’s independence was vital. If the military power attacked Mongolia and cut the Trans-Siberian railway line, the USSR would be over”[1] Indeed, if the Japanese who already controlled Manchuria had colonized the People’s Republic of Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, then the USSR and China would have been separated from each other.

But it was Stalin's paranoia! The "north" group within the Japanese army had already been defeated and the "south" group had seized power. This meant that the Japanese would continue to expand their war into the South China Sea. Besides they had been already sunk into a mud because of the full-scale war they started in China. So it was clear that they would not launch a military operation in the Far East. To the question "How many men will Japan need to fight China with all its might?" it is said Chiang Kai-shek replied "500 million". This is close to truth number. The Japanese fought an eight-year war with China, but with no results. Stalin was well aware of this balance of power. But a jealous and cautious person like him needed full confidence. This is when Stalin may have planned to strike the Japanese by surprise and assure the government that they would never invade the Soviet Union. Such a speculative conclusion comes out of what happened after.

Because of that it was in the Soviets interest to keep Japan out of Mongolia to protect the Trans-Siberian and Lake Baikal. They wanted to ensure that the Sino-Japanese clash line remained as far south of Mongolia's southern border as possible. Once Japan had control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, it would be nor hard for them to severe direct land links between China and the USSR. Stalin was playing double game by supporting the Chinese to prolonge the Sino-Japanese war to guarantee the security of the Soviet Far East. As for Stalin, he did not want to quarrel with either side of the war, but if the war ended in complete defeat for China, there would be terrible danger. So he decided to build a large defense system that would cover the entire Far East. The PRM was in this defensive system. Stalin therefore eliminated the stubborn and intractable Mongol rulers in order to deploy the Red Army on Mongolian territory.



In August 1929, Blücher was appointed as a Commander of the newly formed Far Eastern Special Army (ASEO). Soon after to build general defense system and with the aim of creating a modern army in Mongolia, a decision was made to conscript thirty thousand men, but only two thousand were actually enlisted (ibid).[2] To improve the situation, A. I. Gekker* was appointed to Mongolia. While in Ulaanbaatar, he was nearly killed probably he nearly became a victim of an intrigue. In a country where many of the men were monks, iron hands needed be recruited men into the army. This was another reason Stalin did terror in Mongolia. Reign of a military system with tight order and disciplinary needed for a defense zone to be ready for a war. By the end of the Great Purge, Stalin truly managed to metamorphose Mongolia into a country with such regime.

After conquering Manchuria, the Japanese gave the autonomy to Mongolia and granted a special right to the Mongols gaining people’s support. They were able to contact and help Prince Demchignorov* who was fighting against the Chinese. At the beginning of the war against China, the Japanese occupied Inner Mongolia, where they were greeted as a liberator, not as an occupant. In addition, six banner princes, five monks and ten officers of the Inner Mongolian army, as representatives of Rehe (Jehol) province, met the last Qing emperor, Pu Yi, and announced to him that their region was rallying to Manchoukuo.[3] This was a bad omen for the danger that the Mongols could take side with Japan anytime. This favorable inclination towards Japan also offered Stalin a reason to stage the Great Purge in Mongolia. He wanted to make it clear to all Mongols, in their bones and flesh, that the mere mention of a rapprochement with Japan entailed a grave danger.

The time had come to consolidate the Mongolian army. Voronin would take care of political education, I. Pliyev* would train military cadres, K. Rokossovsky* would create the first Mongolian cavalry regiment, and V. Soudiets* would establish his air force. In 1937, the Soviet Seventeenth Army under the leadership of N. Feklenko* was deployed to Mongolia and formed its headquarter in Ulaanbaatar. This special corps was under the direct command of the People's Commissariat for Defense. The 36th Rifle Division with a total of 9,938 people was organized under the corps. According to the minutes of the 63rd Politburo meeting, the division had 1,392 vehicles, 36 45mm artillery pieces, 42 76mm artillery pieces, 12 122mm artillery pieces, 37 BT tanks, 44 BT20 armored vehicles and 139 machine guns, 506 handgun, 39 Zenith machine guns and so on. Stalin's signature appeared at the bottom.[4]

The Mongolian army was led initially by Demid*, a graduate of the Tver military school, then by J. Lhagvasüren*, a recent graduate of the Lenin military political academy. After the elimination of Genden* and Demid, no one could protest against the increase in military spending. From 1936, the overall expenditure of the army doubled, the number of soldiers increased by 30%, military equipment by 40% and the length of military service was extended to three years.[5]



On August 3, 1938, Konoe, Prime Minister of Japan, said in his speech to parliament that:

The goal of the Japanese Empire is to establish a new order of eternal stability in East Asia. In order to promote this new order, it is necessary to promote cooperation between Japan, Manchoukuo and China in matters of politics, economy and culture…[6]

The Japanese imagined a puppet government in the notion of "China" too. Unable to control the vast Chinese territory, the Japanese decided to form a local and puppet government. On December 14, 1937, the Provisional Government of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Beijing. A few months later, the reformed government of the People's Republic of China was also announced in Nanjing. Wang Jinwei, one of the main leaders of Koumintang party, fled to Hanoi in an attempt to conclude a friendship treaty with Japan. From there, he came to Shanghai, occupied by Japan, and started negotiations. Soon he tried to reach an agreement with a group of fellow Koumintang Party leaders to form a puppet government in Nanjing. They called it the Central Government. He dissolved and reformed the old provisional government. He called on Chiang Kai-shek to end the war and work with the Japanese to build a new Asia.

At this point, Konoe's government would soon resign, and in January 1939 Prince Hiranuma became Prime Minister. As a cautious politician, Hiranuma refrained from immediately accepting the German Nazis' proposal to create a military and political alliance. While the Japanese business community wanted to maintain alliances with the Americans and the British, its military preferred to establish a military, political and ideological alliance with Germany and Italy. They believed in a quick victory in China, which would lead to the union of Japan, China and Manchoukuo, and ultimately all Asian countries as a stronghold against communism and Western imperialism.

On September 28, 1938, in Munich, Adolf Hitler, Mussolini, Bénito Mussolini, the British Prime Minister, N. Chamberlain and the French Prime Minister E. Daladier, ratified the Munich agreements. These were shameful agreements, because Western democracies were kneeling before totalitarian regimes. By dividing Czechoslovakia into several pieces, the Munich accords left Hitler a free hand to undertake his Machiavelligic plans in Europe with impunity. Europe which had stood upright against Hitler was now destitute. In order to expand his conquests in Western Europe, Hitler developed several pressure tactics on Britain and France.

Among these mechanisms, the project to create the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis failed due to Japan's ambivalence. Hitler and Ribbentrop, Germany's foreign minister, wanted Japan to move the conflict south, thereby increasing pressure on Britain and France in Southeast Asia. In other words, Berlin wanted Japan to project itself south and ignore Soviet interests in the north. Japan readily accepted this line of thinking.

On April 27, 1939, the Japanese government addressed the issue of China and South Asia. Faced with the development of the situation in Europe, the government decided to quickly end the war in China, by creating a political and economic union between Japan, China and Manchoukuo. The proposal was sent to Chiang Kai-shek. The latter refused it, because he was expecting a wide support from the United States and the USSR. But the two great powers were more interested in a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese war. The United States provided China with twenty-five million US dollars annually. The USSR, which wanted the war to continue, paid much more by granting it the equivalent of three hundred million US dollars.[7] Since the Japanese could not control Chiang Kai-shek, they installed Wang Jingwei's puppet government in Nanjing in 1940.

The Japanese government sent urgent instructions to Kwantung's army in Japanese Manchuria. These orders called for strengthening the borders between Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union and between Manchoukuo and Mongolia, to establish solid military bases in Manchoukuo by cooperating with the government of the Japanese Empire, Inner Mongolia and North and Central China. They also demanded "a demonstration of the Empire's goodwill through political, economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of Asian solidarity and by employing diplomatic means rather than military pressure.[8]

Kwantung's Army of Manchuria formed the most militarized section of Japanese society. Positioned abroad, it remained beyond the reach of influence of other social groups. Having enjoyed autonomous status for many years, Kwantung’s army began to demand recognition from Tokyo a special and legally guaranteed autonomous status. In September 1939, Tokyo succumbed to the pressure and authorized Kwantung's army to "make autonomous decisions on military, economic and political matters in China and to report them to Headquarters".[9] Before receiving this permission, which approved the autonomy of Kwantung's army, the latter had already taken the decision to convene war. Included in these resolutions was the Battle of Khalkhyn Gol [the Khalkha River] or, to use the Japanese expression, the Nomounkhan Incident, a large-scale border clash between Mongolia and Manchoukuo, in the summer of 1939. The Difference of name comes from divergent conceptions of the borders, the PRM insisting that its border extended along Nomounkhan and the hills of Bürd while, for Japan and Manchoukuo, the border followed the natural delimitation of the Khalkha River . Japanese researchers sometimes naively explained that, insofar as the Japanese were an island people, they had no notion of "land border" and considered the shores of the sea as a frontier ". They therefore believed that the Khalkha River formed a natural border.[10]



Recent archival evidence on the battle of Khasan Lake and Khalkha River gives new information and previous findings have undergone significant corrections. The lake Khasan`s battle took place between July 8 and September 11, 1938, between the Soviet and Japanese armies. The conflict was started by the Soviet side. The two sides agreed to end the conflict through negotiations, but Japan won in terms of manpower. The direct cause of the conflict is very controversial.

On July 8, 1938, under the direct command of Frinovsky, one of the leaders of the NKVD, the Red Army suddenly occupied the head of Zhanggufeng. The Japanese side protested through diplomatic channels. The commander of the Far Eastern front, Marshal Blucher, proposed to Moscow to withdraw its troops. It was only after a major overhaul of the army that there was a serious shortage of management personnel. However, an order came from Moscow to "protect the land of the country to the end".

The battle began on July 29 and many battles took place. According to the Associated Press, which was apart from the Soviet and Japanese propaganda at the time, the Soviets occupied the head of the hill once or twice, but ultimately the Japanese took full control. In this sense, Japan won.[11] On September 10, Maxim Litvinov*, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, summoned Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu* and offered to end the conflict.

The Soviet Union lost 792 people and wounded 3,279. 96 tanks and 30 artillery pieces were lost. The Japanese side lost 526 people and injured 913. Blucher, led the fighting, was arrested at a train station in October upon his arrival in Moscow, imprisoned, tortured and shot on November 9. However, this strange conflict was widely used by Moscow in its ideological campaign. 6,500 military officers were awarded, of which 26 received the Order of the Hero of the Soviet Union and 95 the Order of Lenin.

The Japanese command concluded that the Soviet army was extremely weak and unable to use its manpower and technical advantages.

The conclusions of the Soviet side, in particular Stalin, were as follows: there is no need to fight Japan on the territory of the Soviet Union. This must be done in Mongolia. But officially Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia must fight. In fact, the Mongols must take revenge on the Japanese for Lake Hassan on the Khalkha River. Because a border dispute has been going on near the Khalkha River for several years. More importantly, Mongolia already had enough Soviet troops on its territory to strike at Japan.



According to the Soviet propaganda the Japanese invaded Mongolia, then they attempted to reach Lake Baikal and invade Irkutsk and Vladivostok. This is not true. Will the Japanese, who fought in China and mobilized all their military machinery in the Japan-China War, open another front behind them and provoke a powerful enemy? Looking at the map, it is clear that the Japanese generals would not have chosen the area around the Khalkha River as their base, which is very inconvenient for the advance. From here to Ulaanbaatar, the waterless, uninhabited and roadless Gobi Desert stretches for nearly a thousand kilometers. The similar, deserted 700 km needs to be covered to the Soviet border. In addition, it was impossible for the Japanese to reach Soviet territory via the Khalkha River and Mongolia, given the difficulty of getting supplies for the poor Japanese army.

The left coast of Manchuria is sloping, but the west coast of Mongolia is steep at 75 degrees, which made it difficult for the Japanese to advance. Researcher Edward J. Drea* noted that the west coast was particularly unprofitable because it was higher than the east coast.[12] General Fedyuninsky said: “The eastern bank of the Khalkha river can be seen from the western bank as clearly as on the palm of hand. It is a tactically advantageous location at a height of 2-3 km east of the river."[13]

On May 28, 1939, Soviet authorities reported that at the start of the war the Japanese army had 1,680 units, 900 cavalry and 75 machine guns east of the Khalkha River. It included 18 pieces of artillery, 6 armored vehicles and a single tank. If to add the two khoroos in Khailaar, there will be maximum 10,000 people. It is hard to give any credence that such a force would attack the Soviet Union through Mongolia.

At that time, there were 24 Japanese divisions in mainland China. But there is no reason to bring them in from war with China and turn them against the Soviets. According to Soviet intelligence of February 25, 1939, the Japanese army consisted of 9 infantry, cavalry, artillery divisions, 2 mechanized brigades each, 2 tank corps, 3 security units (responsible for the railway protection), 10 aviation units and 8 border guard garrisons. Kwantung's army had 1,052 heavy weapons, 585 tanks, 355 planes and 359,000 soldiers in Manchuria. Historian Alvin Coox* estimates that Kwantung's army in 1939 numbered a maximum of 270,000 soldiers. According to him, there were 560 planes and 200 tanks in Manchuria.[14]

Against them the Soviet Red Army had 30 anti-aircraft and mechanized divisions, 5-7 cavalry divisions, 6-8 tank brigades, and 24 aviation brigades (as of January 1, 1938, and this number would have increased in May 1939). It (in Far East, Outer Baikal and Mongolia) had 4,716 tanks, 5,748 heavy weapons, 2,623 planes, 450 to 570,000 soldiers, in short it was more armed than those of Kwantung and Korea, i.e. 6 times more planes and 20 times more tanks. There is an unwritten law in the history of war that the aggressor is at least three times as powerful. In this case, is it possible to say that the Japanese invaded the Soviet Union? In the Battle of Lake Khasan, it can be said that the Japanese underestimated the Red Army as not prepared, but it is certain that they didn’t think to win them with eight divisions.[15]

If as it is said in Soviet history, the most advantageous location to invade the Soviet Union was through Mongolia, the Japanese would have to focus all their best military forces there. The 23rd Infantry Division, based in Hailar, 200-220 km from the battlefield, was in charge of this area. Formed on the island of Kyushu in July 1938, the new division has only three divisions and 13,000 men. According to Cooks, 60 old-fashioned guns. Compared to the Japanese, the Soviet 36th Motorized Rifle Division had 99 heavy weapons, 36 45mm tank destroyers, 76mm 20 divisional artillery, 18 SU- series 76mm artillery pieces. 12, 16 122 mm howitzers, 9 self-propelled armored devices of 76 mm, 34-37 light tanks and 58 armored vehicles.

In addition, the 23rd Japanese Division had few artillery pieces, half of which arrived in Hailar in November 1938, and the rest were stationed in Harbin, 700 km away, and did not conduct military exercises. Most of the soldiers were in their first and second years of service, the officers were just graduated, inexperienced. Due to the lack of water, they transported it from a far on horses and camels. Kwantung Army ranked the 23rd Division as below average, and from the beginning it was not planned to go to war, but was stationed in China as a guard. This division was stationed in northern Manchuria for military training, for protection from a possible Soviet attack from Borz station. Kwantung Army Headquarters said the division was not prepared for war and did not expect Mongolian or Soviet attacks against them. So why was this 23rd Division stationed off guard?

The 57th Special Corps stationed in Mongolia numbered 25,809 soldiers, 260 tanks, 281 armored vehicles, 108 airplanes and 522 weapons as of September 9, 1937. As of October 11, 1937, the military corps numbered respectively 29,209 and on 23 of that month this number reached to 32,794. At the start of the conflict, a special corps of motorized diesel, 1 tank, 3 armored motor vehicles, 1 cavalry, a total of five brigades were formed, including 284 tanks, 370 armored vehicles, about 200 weapons and 30 000 soldiers. In addition, at the end of May 1939, an air base was established with 206 E-15bis, 99 I-16203 series fighters, 88 SB series bombers, 16 P-5SH light reconnaissance biplanes and a total of 206 devices. In contrast, the Japanese had 52 planes in the battle for the Khalkha River, 18 of which were espionage. [16]

Byamba Khishigt, a captain of the Mongolian cavalry who fled to Manchoukuo in August 1938, briefed in detail on the Soviet position and the repression in the Mongol army. According to him, “the Mongolian army was not prepared for combat, there were riots in some areas, some Mongolian government officials had anti-Soviet views, 80% of the population did not like the Russians and they were ready to rise up against and waiting for the Japanese ”. He tried to give a false impression that Mongolian people wanted Japanese to invade Mongolia and free them from Soviet oppression. The Japanese did not believe him, and during the Battle of the Khalkha River he was arrested and killed as a Soviet spy and pronounced dead on the battlefield. In short, the Japanese had no plan or interest to invade Mongolia and fight the Soviets. They had espionage information about the Soviet 57 special corps in Mongolia. They had an understanding that the Soviets, thousands of miles from the Khalkha River, were intended to supply arms and supplies to China via Mongolia. The Japanese firmly believed that no Soviet troops had been gathered near the Khalkha River, only Mongolian troops were there.

The task to strengthen the borderline had been arrived from Tokyo anyway. Kwantung army officials drafted “General Principles for the Regulation of the Border Issue between Manchuria and the Soviet Union” a month before the Nomounkhan incident and delivered the document to squads located alongside the borderline as an ordinance. Accordingly where the borderline was unclear squad commanders were given authority to set the borderline independently. In addition to that the squads that were guarding the borderline were permitted to enter Soviet and Mongolian territory temporarily.[17]

The Japanese General Staff accepted the authority of the Guandong army to define the border with Manchuria. As the Kwantung understood, Japanese Military Supreme leaders regarded the Khalkha Gol as a natural border and were given order to protect the border, as well as were prohibited to raid on the Mongolian Peorle`s Republic`s territory. [18]



Stalin wanted a major military conflict. Stalin had several reasons and interests to fight with them. There were as follows:

1) Tokyo had just tried to force Chiang Kai-shek to a truce. If Chiang accepts the proposal, the Sino-Japanese war would stop and the Japanese army will be free. Stalin hated this idea. The Soviets who saw the Sino-Japanese conflict as a guarantee of security its Far East region, could demonstrate their weight as an ally of Chiang Kai-shek by facing the Japanese. It was important for Stalin to show Chiang that apart from moral support and financial and military assistance, the USSR was also capable of fighting its common enemy in a real war.

2) In the conflict around Lake Khasan, the Soviets have shown their weakness and embarrassment. To prove their strength, you have to create and win a new conflict.

3) The confrontation will be taking place on third territory, so there was no risk of overflowing and turning the conflict into a Soviet-Japanese war. Stalin knew well that Tokyo even on purpose provoked and will come into conflict with the Soviets will not start a war. It was also evident that the generals of Kwantung's army did not have an intention to attack Mongolia, and therefore if border conflict will impel to a major military confrontation, it would be not in their interest to make it into a war. If the situation will take such a turn it was obvious that the victory will be on the Soviets side, which was far more military forces. Through Sorge, their spy in Tokyo, the Soviets knew that the Japanese Chiefs of Staff were not interested in increasing their military activities, and in the final phase they concentrated a great deal of military force on the Khankhyn gol river.[19] For the Soviets, this confrontation was not a risk.

4) It was tactically and strategically important to prepare well for battle and defeat the Japanese. It was the opportunity to teach a lesson to the "north" group within the Japanese army which advocated to expand the war towards the Soviet Far East. The defeat of the Japanese at the Khankhyn gol will be an encouragement for Tokyo’s group, which supports to direct the war to the South. As a result the Japanese army will turn its the main forces against the eternal enemies of communism, the United States and Great Britain.

5) Having been defeated in this region in 1904 and 1905, several generations of Russians harbored a desire for revenge. It was an important opportunity to take revenge.

6) Comforting and supporting the Mongols, who suffered from the purge was also vital. Most Mongols knew that the Red Russians had organized the bloody purge, which led to a lack of confidence in the Soviets. The Japanese attack would also show that many Japanese spies were among the Mongols and Soviet military assistance proved to them that they had chosen the right ally and friend. Thus, the confrontation would give the Soviets a chance to improve their image with the Mongols.

7) One of the most important reasons was to test the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis which was to materialize before WWII, because if one of the members of the future axis, like Japan , was hit, the other two would be warned and would think.



On May 11, 1939, Japanese troops occupied the eastern bank of the Khalkha River. Their army consisted of around 10,000 soldiers.[20] The Japanese thought that the Mongolian-Manchu border must be on both sides of the Khalkha River, so they went there and fortified it. On May 29, Mongolian and Soviet troops rushed into the Khalkha River area and launched a counterattack, pushing the Japanese back to the border.

It is a story told and written over many years and which has become a frozen “truth”. This “truth” was always affirmed by one party and it became so strong that it did not give rise to the opposite “real truth”.

On June 26, 1939, 46 days after the start of the Battle of the Khalkha River, the Soviet Information Office released the following information:

“On May 11, Japanese and Manchu troops stormed the Mongolian border post at Nomounkhan Burd Ovoo, 16-20 km southeast of Lake Buir. Therefore Mongolian border guards had to retreat to the east bank of the Khalkha River”[21]

There were no reports on the outpost and on the casualties. The Japanese documented the whole incident in detail, while the Mongols had no information other than from the Soviet Information Bureau. Over the years, all published material on this first battle of the Khalkha River War has been developed slightly further, without adding a single name. At least it's not clear who attacked the Mongolian outpost. Bargas? Soldiers from Manchoukuo? The Japanese? Was there the border outpost at Nomounkhan and Burd Ovoo?

But Colonel Ivan Fedyuninsky, commander of the 24th Motorized Infantry Regiment, wrote in his memoirs that there was no outpost on the banks of the Khalkha River and there were just occasional patrols.[22] Edward J. Drea's wrote a book called Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939 based on material from the Japanese military archives and defined the events of May 11, 1939 as follows:

On May 11, 1939, 70 to 80 Mongolian horsemen, armed with heavy and light machine guns, crossed the Khalkha River and entered Manchuguo territory in search of water and pasture for their horses. A small group of border guards from Manchuguo not far from the colony were attacked. On the Japanese side, an infantry battalion launched a counterattack and pushed the Mongols back across the river. On the battlefield, the Mongols fled, leaving behind the bodies of five soldiers, four dead horses, a large quantity of firearms and ammunition… The next day, another group of 70-80 Mongolian horsemen arrived crossing the river again and crushed the Japanese.

Shaariibuu Yadamsuren (1909-2009), former colonel and commander of the 8th Hyangan Cavalry Unit in Barga, said: “Mongolian soldiers furtively crossing the border, killed two Japanese officers and a Chinese driver who were tracing the border line and fled. This led to the Battle of the Khalkha River. "

In the report of the command documents of the 57th Special Corps of the 1st Army Group, it is stated like this: "The combat capability and discipline of the Mongolian army began to amaze me from the first day ". If Edward Drea wrote a truth, the soldiers who attacked Nomunkhan must had been Soviet soldiers dressed as Mongol soldiers. At that time, the Soviet Chekists killed monks as a class in the name of protecting Mongolian workers, so the Mongols at that time were far from being able to fight for their pasture lands.

The Khalkha River area was controlled by the 23rd Infantry Division of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces, commanded by Lieutenant-General Komatsubara Mititaro*. The headquarters of the division located in Hailar, 217 km from the Khalkha River. The main task of this division was to protect the city of Hailar from possible Soviet attack from Borz direction, but it is not known what were their task regarding Mongolia. One of the regiments was in a very difficult situation. According to Edward Drea, officers at the Japanese headquarters could barely find Nomounkhan on the operational map. Komatsubara initially regarded it as a small conflict and sent a small force. On the 14th, a group of armored mechanized squadrons and cavalry led by Lieutenant Colonel Azuma Yaozo arrived at Burd Ovoo. The Japanese were shocked when the first Mongolian soldiers confronted them. There was no food or drink, no personal effects, no documents, not even newspaper clippings in the pockets of the killed Mongol soldiers, only bullets and grenades. It was as if these unidentified soldiers had come as far as they could to drive out the Japanese.

By direct order of Stalin, a Red Army Military Intelligence Agency was established to provide comprehensive military and technical assistance to China and to conduct special operations in Outer and Inner Mongolia. This organization was called "Operation Z" and it was later referred to as "Line Z" in documents. In Mongolia, the order was implemented by the general military adviser of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army and the head of the military intelligence division. In Moscow, the head and deputy head of the 2nd military intelligence division of the Red Army, the head of the "A" division of overseas operations and the head of the 9th division of secret installations were in charge. This division, also known as the "Mongolian-Xinjiang Division", was reorganized in 1939 and became the division in charge of secret installations under the General Headquarter. In May 1939 Colonel Haji Umar Jiorovich Mamsurov*, known in Spain as the father of sabotage operations, was appointed as ahead of “special division A”.

The attack on Nomounkhan, May 11-15, 1939, reminds us the attack of SS soldiers in Polish uniform on a German radio station in Gliwice, August 31, 1939, and the attack of the Soviet special detachment in the village of Mainilo in Finland on November 26, 1939, and the Soviets attack on the Lithuanian and Latvian border posts June 15, 1940!

Here is the minutes of the 66 of the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unionon the increase of the expenditure related to the operation "Z" in Mongolia:


December 30, 1939

Politburo decision of the Central Committee

People`s Commissariat of Defence – 14,933.75 rubles, 85 kopecks and 45,000 Mongolian tugrugs

1. December 1938. In operation "X", 5,430,000 rubles for organizational costs related to the sale of arms sold in accordance with Politburo decision p66 / 101 for 15 days

2. To cover expenditure for the second half of 1938 and until January 1, 1939, 6,701,326 rubles will be allocated to operation "X" and 2 802,425,000 MNT to operation "Z".

Copies to Voroshilov and Molotov

Stalin, secretary of the center committee[23]

The Japanese firmly believed that no Soviet troops had gathered near the Khalkha River, that there were only Mongolian troops. They were really wrong. When the Mongols first withdrew, they sent Komatsubara's soldiers and part of Azuma back to Hailar. Later, Manchu border guards and the Airi spy noticed that dozens of Mongolian soldiers had crossed the Khalkha River, followed by hundreds of other soldiers, and had violated the border and started to build fortifications. Komatsubara ordered the destroy the intruders, but the Soviets, with tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery, crushed Azuma soldiers. Colonel Yamagata's team has been authorized to recover the bodies of soldiers who died in combat. Then Kwantung's army decided to stop the conflict, saying that "Japanese blood should no longer be shed in Nomounkhan", as Edward J. Drie put it. But the Mongol invasion continued and Komatsubara advanced on both banks of the Khalkha River, as he did not want to lose this strategic area to attack Hailar and Tsitsikhar. Gradually, his inexperienced division was drawn into battle and was defeated by the Soviet army.[24]

Thus, both sides began to prepare intensively for the next conflict. The Japanese brought in the soldiers from the rear and mobilized three times as many troops as before. Moscow also hastily sent G. Zhukov to Mongolia, who then commanded the Soviet army during World War II, and he arrived in Tamsagbulag on June 5. Zhukov thought thatthe 57th Corps in Mongolia was not enough in the next battle,. Then he brought in the First Army Group. These included the 6th Tank Brigade (254 tanks, 15 armored vehicles), the 57th, 82nd and 152nd Rifle Divisions and the 212th Air Brigade. Before the start of the decisive battle of August 20, the First Army Group numbered 52,000 men, 438 tanks and 385 pieces of artillery. In total there were 585 planes.[25]



It turned out that at the start of the battle, the leadership of the corps was not ready. Stalin did not expect to be stuck in the Gobi Desert for three months. They were unable to remove the obstacles that it was about to overthrow Stalin's grand plan. That is why Zhukov was summoned to Khalkhyn Gol from the Western Military District and the problem was solved with his firm hand. Zhukov, as usual, brought into a battle an entire tank brigade, killing 9,703 people and wounding 15,952, leaving the Soviet side with a total of 25,655 casualties. Probably the number of deaths and injuries does not end there. On the other hand, the beaten Japanese had fewer victims. As Russian military historians E. Trifonov*, V. Voronov* and A. Krushelnitsky* have claimed, Voroshilov ridiculed Zhukov's report to Moscow that the Japanese had been completely wiped out and that a total of 61,000 Japanese soldiers were killed and wounded. At the time, Zhukov bought the weapons he had collected from the battlefield for a considerable price, which was even more embarrassing. The Soviets captured 12,000 rifles, almost as many as the number of Japanese soldiers killed and wounded.

However, Stalin did not pay attention to such nonsense. No matter how much damage was done, it was more important for him to intimidate the Japanese who had been under his vendetta since the Lake Hassan Battle, cheer on Kwantung, and prick up Berlin's ears. If the battle had not dragged on for three months, the Kremlin master’s affair would have turned out to be very profitable ...[26]

In early July, during a clash near Bayantsagaan, the Japanese were again beaten and fled. Both sides promptly prepared for the third great battle. The Japanese added two infantry units and a ground brigade, as well as several units of the Manchu army. Air power had been increased and heavy artillery was brought in from Port Arthur. Their manpower reached 76,000, with 304 machine guns, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks and more than 300 aircraft, exceeding the scale of border conflict.

As the Soviets prepared more intensively and withdrew two new artillery divisions, tanks, air units and artillery units from the USSR, they had 1.5 times as many troops, 1.7 times as many machine guns, twice as many guns, 4 times more tanks and 1.6 times more troops than Japan. The number of planes reached 515.[27] The unnoticed conflict escalated into full-scale war. On August 20, the Soviet army suddenly launched a 70-kilometer-wide front attack, besieging the Japanese and hitting them within a week.

According to Soviet estimates, the Japanese lost 18.1 thousand people, including 48.6 thousand wounded in three battles, while the Soviets 8.9 thousand dead and 15.9 thousand wounded.[28] The Japanese have always said that a total of 28,000 to 38,000 soldiers took part in the war, but the Soviets said that number could reach 75,000. The Japanese told the captives and their families that they had been killed because they had been ordered not to surrender. Japan estimated that 7,696 people were killed, 8,647 were injured, 1,021 were missing, 2,350 were sick and a total of 19,714 people, including 2,895 Manchus. The Soviets, on the other hand, increased the number of Japanese casualties from 29,085 to 61,000.

Soviet military historian Colonel-General Grigory Krivosheev * then studied archival documents and estimated that 9,703 Soviet victims were killed, 15,952 injured and a total of 27,880 victims. 253 tanks, 250 planes, 96 artillery pieces and 133 armored vehicles were destroyed, writes Krivosheev in his book.[29] Japan lost 162 planes and 42 tanks and around 3,000 people were captured. The Mongol side reported the loss of 11 armored vehicles, 1,921 horses and camels.[30]

The concealment by the Soviet side of it’s casualties during the Battle of the Khalkha River was a result of its policy of not disclosing information and keeping the damage of war and conflict as a military secret due to the socio-political closed system. The report on the results of the Khalkha River operation did not fully cover the damage caused. The fact that the wounded were treated in hospitals of the Inner Military District, and that there was a conflict between Zhukov and Shtern due to the organization of the military administration, perhaps did not allow to fully estimate the damage at the time. At the same time, the leadership of the First Army Group increased the damage done to the Japanese military. In the past, Soviet history has exaggerated the composition and damage of the Japanese military for ideological reasons.[31]

The whole battle developed within disputed border zone in a very "gentleman" manner. In other words, both sides fought each other over what they argued. After receiving the third blow, on September 12, the Japanese attacked the Nömrög River with great force and captured the left bank. While the Soviets were preparing for a counterattack, Moscow decided to end hostilities on September 15. So Soviet-Japanese talks began in Moscow. As a result of the Khalkha River War, the Mongolian People's Republic lost the eastern banks of the Nömrög River and Mount Mana to China through the fault of the Soviet Union and Japan. Brigadier General Bogdanov* wrote a letter to Molotov: “The Nömrög River was not a controversial Manchu-Mongolian issue, and Nomounkhan's issue did not cover this issue as well, in fact fight shouldn't have been there. The Japanese had deliberately invaded and occupied the region on September 12 before entering into reconciliation talks and signing the agreement ”.[32]

As a result of the Battle of the Khalkha River, the Mongols completely lost Mount Mana, east of the Nömrög River, which had not been involved in any border incidents. On September 12, when the Soviet Union and Japan began reconciliation talks in Moscow, the Japanese side suddenly attacked and acted "against the rules." As a result, the Mongolian Army 22nd Cavalry Corps was still blamed with treason, fear, retreat, etc., and the soldiers of this corps also concealed the fact that they were fighting in the Khalkha River. It appears that Mana Mountain was actually occupied by Bargas.* For neither the Mongols nor the Barga cavalry knew at all why they were fighting on the Khalkha River, in what areas and where the boundaries of the battlefield were. Neither the Soviets nor the Japanese told them. Since the Mongolian People's Army was intended to fight the Barga cavalry, not the Japanese, if Mana Mountain was occupied, the Mongolian cavalry was to liberate Mana Mount from Bargas, not the Japanese. The 22nd khoroo was unable to fight each other due to a sudden order that the two sides should not move from where they are now, as negotiations were underway in Moscow.[33]

The 6th Mongolian Cavalry Division took an active part in the Battle of the Khalkha River from May 17 until the end of the battle, and the 8th Cavalry Division participated in almost all battles from July 3.

In 1931, three R-5 planes were donated by the USSR and so the Mongolian Air Force was established. Before the Battle of the Khalkha River, the Mongolian Air Force had 39 R-5 planes and but there were 27 Mongolian pilots. Mongolian Air Force and Motorized Armored Corps (7 armored vehicles) fought in the Battle of the Khalkha River as part of the Soviet Union.[34]

The 237 deaths on the Mongolian side accounted for less than one percent of the total number of massacres at the time.[35] However, the Mongol side did its best to repel the Japanese aggression. The 6th and 8th Mongolian Cavalry Divisions were almost invisible in the great battles of the two superpowers, which are equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment in the world. Of course, modern tanks, planes, and artillery weren't chased by horses or swords. As the Japanese brought in the battle 12,000 Barga warriors, the Mongolian regular army was intended to fight them, that meant the Mongols to kill the Mongols.

The Manchoukuo units that fought on the Japanese side had weapons captured from Chinese troops and Japanese obsolete weapons. The 4th, 5th, 8th and 12th Manchu Cavalry Corps entered the battle. Each committee had 400 to 500 men and a battalion of 4 pieces of artillery.[36]

The Barga regiments, headed by Lieutenant-General Ürjin Garmaev*, a Buryat lieutenant general of the Manchu counterintelligence service, may have created barrier for the Japanese from fighting the Mongol brothers rather than helping them. D. Jargalov, major of the Manchu army and former spy officer of the Mongolian People's Republic, published a book in Mongolia. He wrote in detail: “U. Garmaevinitiated a large-scale campaign in Buryat-Mongolian cavalry units to warn not to kill brothers. As testified the soldiers under General Garmaev, soldiers shouted “We will not kill each other, we will not give our lives for Japan! and fired in the air ”. Doesn't it seem strange that Japan sent a small and ill-prepared army to "conquer Mongolia"?[37]

Later when Garmaev was arrested and interrogating in Moscow said that Barga's cavalry was tasked with protecting the two Japanese wings. The 6th and 8th Mongolian Cavalry Committees, led by Choibalsan, were responsible for overseeing the two wings of the Soviet army. As a result, the barga Mongols on horseback were forced to fight the khalkha Mongols on horseback. As soon as the Battle of the Khalkha River was over, Garmaev was summoned to Harbin and immediately sent back.[38]

One should pay attention to the composition of the manpower of the 6th Army. The 23rd Infantry Division - the main force of the Japanese group - was created to protect the railway tracks. So it could not therefore be considered as a unit fully meeting the requirements of combat. So these kinds of units were made up of poorly trained officers and soldiers in any country. Like the entire Manchoukuo army and brigade, made up of Chinese captives and former hunters, the Manchu brigade was awashed with bad habits such as flight, alcohol and drugs. They were of little help.

The Mongolian People's Army was very weak at the time when the Battle of the Khalkha River started. There were only 17.8 thousand people (including the staff of the Ministry of Defense and the officers' school). The army consisted of eight cavalry divisions and one armored brigade. The cavalry divisions (actually the light cavalry committee) were to have 17 artillery pieces (actually 12-13), 9 BA-6s and FAI armored vehicles, but the USSR agreed to provide only 15 instead of the 72 required. There were only four tanks and 63 spy and transport planes, but only 27 pilots existed. However, the Japanese were not able to make a strong offensive due to their geographical location.[39]

So, Prime Minister Genden's prediction of a few years earlier, was confirmed. He said: " only Russia and Japan are going to fight, we don't need to fight the Manchus and the Bargas". The Barga cavalry was stationed from both wings of the Japanese army, while the Mongol cavalry was from the Soviet army. The hero Dandar, legendary Mongolian soldier, was born from this battle of Mongolian horses.

Although the purge was drawing to a close, a large-scale habit of mass arrest and killing still existed on the front lines. Arrests of high-ranking officers were common during the fighting. About 30 Mongolian soldiers were killed and many more were injured when a Soviet aircraft mistakenly bombed the 8th Cavalry Division.[40] For this incident someone was to be blamed. Ts. Luvsandonoi*, the Deputy Army General and Deputy Minister of the Defense Ministry were "unmasked" as a Japanese spy and shot dead in Moscow. Solzhenitsyn wrote about it clearly how suspicion, assassinations and massacres continued during this battle, which was a major prelude to WWII for the Soviet military.[41] J. Tsereng*, the Chief of the General Headquarter, who played an important role in the war, was convicted in 1940 of being a Japanese spy.

After the arrest of Luvsandonoi, who had led the Battle of the Khalkha River, J. Lkhagvasuren, aged 27, just graduated from military school, was appointed Zhukov's deputy to lead all units of the Mongolian army. In just three months, he was promoted from commissar of the regiment to Commander of a Brigade, Division and Corps.

Zhukov's tactics in the Battle of the Khalkha River became his hallmark, and he was later known around the world as a talented general who had led the war against Germany. However, some researchers believe that Colonel-General Gregory Shtern*, who was his commanding officer, played a larger role in the Battle of the Khalkha River. He was awarded the title of Hero of the USSR for leading the Battle of the Khalkha River. Shtern was arrested in 1941 as a German spy and executed. He was a Jew. In In general Pavel Grigorenko`s subsequent memoir of some research paper it is said that the real hero of the Khalkha River was Shtern, and that Zhukov deliberately tarnished the merits of his immediate superior.[42]



The Nomounkhan incident made it clear in Tokyo that the Soviets were ready to take up the Japanese challenge. Crises came in the Japanese government as Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a pact in Moscow, and the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro* was resigned. Japan's new government said it won’t intervene in the mess that was shaking Europe. By September 1939, Moscow and Tokyo had realized the need to stop the confrontation. Molotov and Japanese Ambassador Shigenori Togo* entered into negotiations to cease fire and define the border demarcation, so the conflict was legally settled.

The talks on regulation of the border dispute began on September 15, 1939 but lasted till the end of 1941. In November 1939, a joint Soviet-Japanese commission was created to establish the border between the RPM and Manchoukouo. The commission met sixteen times, alternately in Chita and Harbin, but without giving concrete results.[43] At the heart of the dispute between the two sides was the topographic map. The map of the geodesic structure of the Transbaikal region of the USSR, which dated from 1906, and that of the Chinese General Staff of 1918 were different.[44] The Japanese were disappointed with the failure of the negotiations. They were eager to resolve the problem because they were fighting with China.

The border clash that lasted several years between Manchouku and Mongolia was eventually settled by more powerful actors. When the Japanese foreign minister visited Moscow in the spring of 1941, after the Nomounkhan incident ended, he and Molotov decided to establish a status quo regarding the border between the two states. The joint commission ratified the pact in October 1941 in Harbin. Delegates from Manchoukouo and Mongolia also signed the document in a "friendly atmosphere".

After settling the Nomounkhan issue with the USSR, the General Headquarter in Tokyo made all the leaders of the Kwantung army take responsibility for the incident and made almost all of them to resign. Kwantung Commander Uzemu established a new rule that the General Commander would make the decision to whether to place or not military units in the unresolved parts of the border and whether to attack or not if the Soviet-Mongolian army will breach in. This was a solution totally contrary to the general principles adopted in April.[45]

Lieutenant-General Komatsubara Michitaro was appointed as a Commander of the 23rd Infantry Division in July 1938. He was 53 years old when the Battle of the Khalkha River broke. He served as a junior officer during the brief siege of the German base at Qingdao in 1914, had no previous experience in commanding a field unit or in combat. Generally, he worked in the field of diplomacy and espionage. From 1909 to 1910 he was assistant to the military attaché in Russia, at the General Headquarter, then in 1919 at the military espionage, and until 1926 he worked in the European and American departments. In February 1927, at the age of 40, he was appointed as a military attaché in Moscow, where he remained until December 1929. He spoke Russian fluently. Komatsubara was recalled ahead of completing his term and was appointed as Harbin's special agency after establishing Manchoukouo. This agency was responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence. He was promoted to Sergeant-General on August 1, 1934, a Commander of the 8th Infantry Brigade, and a year later a Commander of the 1st Imperial Guard. So on he quickly became Lieutenant-General. So it is obvious that the Japanese who appointed such an inexperienced person to the battlefield did not really believe that there would be a war on the Khalkha River.[46]

He was dismissed from his post for his responsibilities in the defeat. He was pronounced dead doing hara-kiri, but in reality he died of stomach cancer in 1940.[47] Stalin asked Zhukov who had led the Battle of the Khalkha River: “Comrade Zhukov , why did you kill General Komatsubara who knows thirty languages? He stood up and said, "Comrade Stalin, I didn't know General Komatsubara knew so many languages. If I had known, I would have saved him ”. Later Zhukov told Tsedenbal about this exchange.[48]

Colonel General and former chief of staff of the Kwantung army Ürjin Garmaev surrendered to the Red Army and was taken prisoner and executed in 1947 for treason. But there is an evidence that he was not executed and that he taught at the Soviet Military Academy under a different name. His relatives received money from Moscow, and his daughter Sanjidmaa, who lived in China, learned in 1967 that her father had died in Moscow. However, the Russian Attorney General's Office, which rehabilitated Garmaev, set the date of his death at 1974.[49]

It is an ugly truth there were no borderline drawn on the political map of the world. However, there was a border between Outer Mongolia belonging to China and the Barga region of China. The Soviet Union and Japan fought in the Far East of the Mongolian People's Republic not on their own territory. In fact, the People's Republic of Mongolia and Manchukouo considered themselves a state but no one recognized them as independent countries at the time. Even the Soviet Union did not recognize the People's Republic of Mongolia and Japan the Manchoukuo. They said to them, “You are an independent country,” then they said something different to the others. Therefore, the Battle of Khalkhyn Gol took place at the Khalkha-Barga border of “Chinese territory” at that time.

When the Battle of Khalkhyn Gol set in, everyone who should have known or at least guessed what had happened had died or were killed, and only a few who did know were afraid to reveal the truth. Mongolian social, historical and political memory was erased when “the war of Khalkhyn Gol and propoganda” began.

No one arose a question about why Kwantung's army that grew from around 100,000 to 1.5 million manpower within a decade were launching an offensive against a few Mongolian border guards and why they were defeated again and again. The most forbidden thing in a communist society was to doubt and contemplate. Why didn't this powerful Japanese army invaded the Khalkha river but never went further? Why the Soviet Red Army achieved a "victory" in small area of the Khalkha river, but satisfied with such a a minor victory? Why they didn’t crushed Guangdong once they had a chance? There was no one to dare to ask such questions. The mindset of Mongolian society had been lost the ability to doubt, turning into a “blank paper”, able to receive only prepared propaganda.[50]

Unable to win the Battle of the Khalkha River, the Japanese subsequently refused to participate in Hitler's war against the USSR. The Japanese General Headquarter notified that Japan would go to war only after the occupation of Moscow. Hitler insisted them to attack the Russia from Far East. But the Japanese Government had decided to refrain from going to war until the German’s victory over Russia will be obvious.[51]

The Solovoyovsk-Ereen-Tsav-Bayantümen railway line of 238 km and the Bayantümen-Tamsagbulag railway of 380.5 km were built in 76 working days for the Battle of the Khalkha River. But the battle was over when the railroad was ready for use. However, this railway was used by the Soviets and Mongols when the war was declared in 1945 against Japan. The Ereen-Tsav-Bayantümen wide gauge railway (today the town of Choybalsan) is in use even today. After the war, the rails of the Bayantümen-Tamsagbulag railway line were removed and used for the further construction in Mongolia. Indeed, the rails were used as pillars of the telephone lines.

* Gekker, Anatoly (1888-1937) Soviet military commander (Komkor) involved in the Russian Civil War.

* Prince Demchignorov (1902-1966) Qing dynastyMongolprince descended from the Borjigin imperial clan who lived during the 20th century and became the leader of an independence movement in Inner Mongolia. He was most notable for being the chairman of the pro-JapaneseMongol Military Government (1938–39) and later of the puppet state of Mengjiang (1939–45), during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

* Pliyev, Issa (1903-1979) Soviet military commander, Army General, Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. Pliyev became known in the West largely for his involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis

* Rokosovsky, Konstantin (1896-1968) Soviet and Polishofficer who became Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland. He was among the most prominent Red Army commanders of World War II.

* Sudets, Vladimir (1904-1981) Soviet air commander during World War II, commanding the 17th Air Army, and later became Marshal of the aviation after the war.

* Feklenko, Nikolay (1901-1951) Soviet military commander, general, involved in the Khalkha river buttle.

* Demid, Gelegdorjiin (1900-1937) Prominent political and military figure in 1920s and 1930s Mongolia who served as minister of war and Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic

* Lhagwasuren, Jamyangyn (1912-1982) Mongolian military commander, general, Minister of Defence (1959-1969)

* Genden, Peljidiin (1892-1937) Prime Minister of Mongolia (1932-1936)

* Litvinov, Maxim (1876-1951) Russian revolutionary and prominent Soviet politician. Litvinov was named as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, the highest diplomatic position in the Soviet state (1930-1939)

* Shigemitsu, Mamoru (1887-1957) Japanese diplomat and politician in the Empire of Japan, who served as the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of World War II and later, as the Deputy Prime Minister of Japan (1954-1956)

* Drea Edward (1944) US military historian

* Coox, Alvin (1924-1999) US military historian

* Komatsubara, Mititaro (1886-1949) a general in the Imperial Japanese Army, during the Nomonhan Incident.

* Mamsurov, Haji Umar Jiorovich (1903-1968) Deputy Head of the State Intelligence Directorate of USSR. General, head of diversant operation “special division A”. Known in Spain as the father of sabotage operations. Ossetin nationality.

* Trifonov, Eugeny (1962) Russian military historian

* Voronov, Vladimir(1963)Russian military historian

* Krushelnitsky, Alexandr (1954) Russian military historian

* Grigory Krivosheev (1929-2019) Russian military historian

* Bogdanov, Semyon (1894-1960) SovietMarshal of tank forces, and twice Hero of the Soviet Union

* Bargas or Barga Mongols - are a subgroup of the Mongol people which gave its name to the Baikal region.  Mongolian-speaking people, living mainly in the north of Inner Mongolia in China.

* Garmaev, Urjin (1888-1947) White Army officer, lieutenant general of the Japanese controlled ManchukuoImperial Army, headmaster of the Xing'an Military School.

* Luvsandonoi, Tserejawyn (1903-1939) Mongolian military commander, Deputy Minister of Defence.

* Tsereng, Jamsrangyn (1908-1941) Chief of Mongolian military staff.

* Shtern, Grigory (1900-1941) Soviet officer in the Red Army and military advisor during the Spanish Civil War. He also served with distinction during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars and the Winter War.

* Hiranuma, Kiichiro (1867-1952)a prominent pre–World War II right-wing Japanese politician and Prime Minister of Japan in 1939. He was convicted of war crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment.

* Togo, Sjirenori (1882-1950)Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Empire of Japan at both the start and the end of the Axis–Allied conflict during World War II.

[1]Rupen, Robert. A. How Mongolia is Really Ruted; A Political History of the Mongolian People’s Republic 1900-1978 (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford) pp-45-171

[2]Rupen, Robert. A. How Mongolia is Really Ruted; A Political History of the Mongolian People’s Republic 1900-1978 (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford)

[3]Сапожников, Б. Г. Китай в огне войны, 1931-1950 (“Наука” Москва 1977) стр-43 [Sapozhnikov, B.G. China in the fire of war, 1931-1950 (Publishing house "Nauka" Moscow 1977)] p-43

[4]Сталин ба Монгол“57 дугаар онцгой копусын асуудлаар УТТ-ы хуралдааны 63 дугаар протокол” (Шинжлэх ухааны академийн Түүхийн хүрээлэн Улаанбаатар 2010) х-158-159 [Stalin and Mongolia]

[5]Бүгд найрамдах Монгол ард улсын түүх, III (Улаанбаатар 1969) x-371 [History of the Mongolian People`s Republc, III]

[6]Сапожников, Б. Г. Китай в огне войны, 1931-1950 (Изд. “Наука” Москва 1977) стр-122 [Sapozhnikov, B.G. China in the fire of war, 1931-1950 (Publishing house "Nauka" Moscow 1977)] p-122

[7]Сапожников, Б. Г. Китай в огне войны, 1931-1950 (Изд. “Наука” Москва 1977) стр-123 [Sapozhnikov, B.G. China in the fire of war, 1931-1950 (Publishing house "Nauka" Moscow 1977)] p-123

[8]Сапожников, Б. Г. Китай в огне войны, 1931-1950 (Изд. “Наука” Москва 1977) стр-125 [Sapozhnikov, B.G. China in the fire of war, 1931-1950 (Publishing house "Nauka" Moscow 1977)] p-125

[9]Сапожников, Б. Г. Китай в огне войны, 1931-1950 (Изд. “Наука” Москва 1977) [Sapozhnikov, B.G. China in the fire of war, 1931-1950 (Publishing house "Nauka" Moscow 1977)]

[10]Дашдулам, Д. Халхын голын дайн: Японы түүх бичлэгт (МУИС-ын эрдэм шинжилгээний бичиг #245,Улаанбаатар 2005) х-267[Dashdulam, D. War in Khalkhiin gol in Japan`s historiography

[11]FRUS Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III dokument 497.

[12]Drea, Edward J. Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939(Combat studies Institute 2017)

[13]Федюнинский И. И. На Востоке (Воениздат, Москва 1985). [Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East (Military Publishing House, Moscow 1985)].

[14]Coox Alvin.D. Nomonhan: Japan against Russia,1939 (Stanford University Press, 1990)

[15]Bоронов.В, Крушельницкий Халх голын тулалдаанд хэн хохирсон бэ? (Nepko publishing Улаанбаатар 2019) х-28[Voronov. V, Krushelnitsky.G. Who lost in Halhiin gol Ulaanbaatar 2019] р-28

[16]Bоронов.В, Крушельницкий Халх голын тулалдаанд хэн хохирсон бэ? (Nepko publishing Улаанбаатар 2019) х-39[Voronov. V, Krushelnitsky.G. Who lost in Halhiin gol Ulaanbaatar 2019]р-39

[17]Болд, Р. Халх голын байлдаан (Nepko publishing 2013) х-32[Bold, R. Battles in the Khalkhin Gol]

[18]Болд, Р. Халх голын байлдаан (Nepko publishing 2013) х-33[Bold, R. Battles in the Khalkhin Gol]

[19]Мики Хидэннари Халх гол: Түүхэн үнэний эрэлд; Тухайн цаг үеийн олон улсын байдлын үүднээс Номунхан үйл явдлыг авч үзэх нь (УБ 1993) х-88 [Hidenari, Miki. Khalkh Gol: In search of historical truth. Consideration of Nomunkhan event in the light of political situation at that time]

[20]Вартанов, В. Илтгэл (Халх голын дайн, түүхэн үнэний эрэл симпозиум УБ 1994)[Vartanov, V. Report]

[21]Сообщение ТАСС о столкновениях на монгольско-маньчжурской границе. 26 июня 1939 г (Документы ХХ века [TASS report on clashes on the Mongol-Manchu border. June 26, 1939 (Documents of the XX century]

[22]Федюнинский И. И. На Востоке (Воениздат, Москва 1985). [Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East (Military Publishing House, Moscow 1985)]

[23]Сталин ба Монгол“Х ажиллагаатай холбоотой зардлын тухай УТТ-ы хуралдааны 66 дугаар протокол” (Шинжлэх ухааны академийн Түүхийн хүрээлэн Улаанбаатар 2010) х-163 [Stalin and Mongolia]

[24]Drea,Edward J. Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939(Combat studies Institute 2017)

[25]Хангай, Л. Монгол-Оросын хамтын ажиллагаа (Улаанбаатар 2016) 24-25 [Khangai, L. The Reletionship and cooperation between Mongolia and Russia]

[26]Bоронов.В, Крушельницкий Халх голын тулалдаанд хэн хохирсон бэ? (Nepko publishing Улаанбаатар 2019) х-34-47 [Voronov. V, Krushelnitsky.G. Who lost in Halhiin gol Ulaanbaatar 2019]

[27]Бүгд найрамдах Монгол ард улсын түүх, III (Улаанбаатар 1969) x-373 [History of the Mongolian People`s Republc, III]

[28]Гомбосүрэн, Д. Халх голын дайны түүх судлалын зарим асуудал, үр дүн (Халх голын дайн, түүхэн үнэний эрэл симпозиум Улаанбаатар 1994) [Gombosuren, D. Some problems and consequence on historiography of the Khalkh gol war]

[29]Кривошеев,Г. Ф. Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века: Потери Вооружённых Сил (Москва 2001). [Krivosheev, G.F. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses of the Armed Forces (Moscow 2001)]

[30]Kolomiets, M. “Boi u reki Khalkin-Gol”, Frontovaya Illyustratsiya/Frontline Illustration, 2/2002

[31]Болд, Равдангийн Статистикийг дахин тооцох нь(Nepko publishing Улаанбаатар 2019) х-74 [BoldRawdangiin. Reconsiderations of some statistic Ulaanbaatar 2019] р-74

[32]Бригад командлагч Богдноваас Гадаад хэргийн ардын комиссар Молотовын нэр дээр бичсэн илтгэх хуудас (Ил товчоо сонин УБ 1994) [Report by Brigade Commander Bogdanov to The People`s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Molotov]

[33]Батбаяр. Б Халх голын тулалдаанд хэн хохирсон бэ? (Nepko publishing Улаанбаатар 2019) х-74 [Batbayar.B. Who lost in Halhiin gol Ulaanbaatar 2019] р-74

[34]Хангай, Л. Монгол-Оросын харилцаа, хамтын ажиллагаа (Улаанбаатар 2016) х-22-23 [Khangai, L. The Reletionship and cooperation between Mongolia and Russia]

[35]Ганболд, Б. Халх голын дайнаас МАХЦ-т учирсан хүн хүчний хохирол (Халх голын дайн, түүхэн үнэний эрэл симпозиум Улаанбаатар 1994) [Losses of the Mongolian army during Khalkh gol war]

[36]Хангай, Л Монгол-Оросын харилцаа, хамтын ажиллагаа (Улаанбаатар 2016) х25 [Khangai, L. The Reletionship and cooperation between Mongolia and Russia]

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